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International investment law and decentralized targeted sanctions:  






Since March 2014, several countries, including the United States (US), the European 
Union (EU), Japan, and Canada, have implemented sanctions (including travel bans and 
asset freezes) against Russian and Ukrainian individuals and firms due to the Ukrainian 
crisis. This form of decentralized smart sanctions could also be applied against other 
countries’ nationals (e.g., due to human rights violations). Those sanctions are an 
important means of effectuating international law, particularly if the United Nations (UN) 
does not adopt centralized sanctions.  
 
Nevertheless, those sanctions may possibly conflict with international investment law, 
rendering them less effective. For example, Russian citizens whose accounts are frozen 
pursuant to such sanctions could sue for expropriation, as well as for a breach of fair and 
equitable treatment (FET), under the Canadian-Russian international investment 
agreement (IIA). If successful, Canada would need to pay damages to the sanctioned 
investors, nullifying the sanctions’ purpose. Russia has 59 IIAs in force, while Ukraine 
has 56. A key inquiry, therefore, concerns the circumstances and legal assumptions under 
which this scenario could occur, given the many legal grey zones in those cases.  
 
Although in some circumstances a sole bank account may not count as an “investment” 
under the terms of an IIA, in most cases, especially if firms are targeted, the satisfaction 
of this requirement will be unproblematic. Furthermore, there is little doubt that a longer-
term asset freezing, without due process, is an expropriation even if the legal title is not 
taken and a violation of FET. How can a sanctioning host country defend itself? 
 
New US and Canadian BITs contain non-precluded-measures clauses, including 
measures for the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security that 
permit resorting to sanctions. Most current European IIAs do not contain this clause. 
Thus, the only possibility for the host country to defend itself against a claim is through 
reference to customary international law, namely the law of countermeasures as 
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promulgated by the International Law Commission in the Articles on the Responsibility 
of States for Intentionally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA). Two cases have to be distinguished 
in this context: (1) injured states taking measures to react to the injury (Art. 42, 49 
ARSIWA) and (2) non-injured states taking measures to effectuate obligations owed to 
the international community as a whole (Art. 48). Whereas in the former case, the 
measures can (within certain limits) violate international law, as e.g. targeted sanctions 
under an IIA, in the latter case it is heavily disputed whether non-injured states can only 
use lawful reprisals. Absent this restriction, any (powerful) state may have an excuse to 
take countermeasures outside of the UN. Following the International Law Commission, 
the sanctions against Russia by non-injured states would likely be violating the IIAs, and 
the sanctioning states would need to pay damages.   
 
Were a tribunal to follow academic opinions
1
 that countermeasures by non-injured states 
are allowed, certain limits would have to be respected. Any countermeasure has to 
respect obligations regarding the protection of fundamental human rights. Accordingly, if 
the legal obligations in IIAs are considered an objective human rights regime, 
expropriation would not be accepted; if IIAs are viewed as a reciprocal inter-state regime, 




A further contentious issue is the nature of investors’ rights. If those are merely derived 
by being third-party beneficiaries,
3
 or they are viewed as belonging only to states, 
sanctioning would be possible. But if IIAs give a direct right to investors, they would be a 
third-party who, therefore, in principle, cannot be sanctioned.
4
 Tribunals have so far 
overwhelmingly followed the direct rights approach and, thus, denounced sanctioning 




In short, this legal conflict has been largely overseen by policymakers. Unless states write 
explicitly in their IIAs that measures for the restoration of international peace and 
security are permissible, they risk rendering large parts of decentralized targeted 
sanctions useless by being held liable for damages, endangering the effectuation of 
international law. 
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